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RECIPROCITY AND THE PRIVATE PLAINTIFF
By HAL. M. SMITH* AND THOMAS M. WILSON III**
Business reciprocity is the use of buying power to obtain some
preference in the sale of one's products or services. For example, a
baker of bread might agree to buy some amount of yeast from a food
distributor provided the food distributor agreed to buy some quantity
of bread from him. Although the practice typically involves direct
reciprocal purchases between two parties, it can be indirect or second-
ary, taking the form of securing favors from a customer of a customer.
Thus A might preferentially buy from B, who preferentially buys from
C, with C, in turn, preferentially buying from A. Such preferential
buying can be viewed as a restraint of trade because it interferes with
the basic antitrust goal of open competition based on price, quality and
service. If a reciprocal purchasing arrangement is held to be an illegal
restraint of trade under the federal antitrust laws, then any business-
man injured by the restraint is entitled to recover his provable damages,
trebled, plus his reasonable attorneys' fees.'
There are two types of potential private plaintiffs who may seek
to recover damages flowing from illegal reciprocity. A businessman
who is a party to a reciprocal purchasing arrangement may claim that
he has been injured by having to pay too much for what he buys. A
competing businessman may claim that he has been injured by being im-
properly prevented from selling to a party to the reciprocity agreement.
Under federal law, the claim of either type of plaintiff will arise
under section 1 of the Sherman Act, 2 which proscribes every contract,
* Professor of Law, University of Maryland School of Law. LL.B., 1948, J.D.,
1954, University of Chicago.
** Partner, Wilson & Towner, Towson, Maryland. A.B., 1958, Brown Uni-
versity; J.D., 1971, University of Maryland School of Law.
1. Clayton Act § 4, 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1970). The same remedy is now available
under Maryland law. MD. ANN. CODE art. 83, § 41(2) (Supp. 1972).
2. 15 U.S.C. § 1 (1970). The law of Maryland [MD. ANN. CODE art. 83, §§ 36-49
(Supp. 1972)] is in accord, but this article will limit its discussion to federal law.
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combination or conspiracy in restraint of trade. To recover, the private
plaintiff must establish (1) a contract or combination, (2) his injury
and damage and (3) the illegality of the reciprocity. He is apt to face
difficult legal and practical problems in proving the element of contract
or combination to engage in the reciprocity. Although many of these
problems of proof will be encountered by either type of plaintiff, a party
to a reciprocity agreement faces additional difficulty if he seeks to
recover for the consequences of his own agreement. The major prob-
lems in proving the fact of injury and the amount of damages will be
different for the two types of plaintiffs, with the party to the recipro-
city having the problem of showing injury flowing from a' bargain
which probably conferred reciprocal benefits on him, and the excluded
competitor having the problem of showing that he would have gotten
some of the business absent the reciprocity.
Even if combination to engage in reciprocity and resulting injury
and damage are proven, there may be no recovery. As yet there is little
legal authority setting forth the circumstances under which agreements
to .engage in reciprocity are illegal under the Sherman Act. •Perhaps
reciprocity is illegal only where one party thereto is coerced.. Perhaps
only reciprocity which involves some substantiality in terms of dollar
amount or percentage of the market is illegal. Perhaps illegality will
in some way depend upon a combination of coercion and substantiality:
This article will examine the hurdles facing a private plaintiff .in
proving contract or combination, injury and damages and illegality.
To provide a framework for that analysis, the economics of reciprocity
will be considered and the scant direct authority on the illegality; of
reciprocity reviewed.
THE ECONOMICS OF RECIPROCITY
With the increasing growth and visibility of conglomerate enter-
prises which engage in various businesses in separate markets, 'the
concern about the anti-competitive effects of reciprocity has grown.
Reciprocity between two single-line firms does not obviously depart
from the open competition model. If a truck manufacturer conditions
his purchases of paint upon a paint supplier's reciprocal purchases of
trucks needed in the supplier's paint business, he is not offering or
securing some advantage which other truck manufacturers or paint
suppliers could not offer. Although ideal price competition may be
3. An excellent, concise treatment of the practice and economics of reciprocity is
found in Hausman, Reciprocal Dealing and the Antitrust Laws, 77 HARV. L. REv. 873,
874-80 (1964).
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blunted, competing truck suppliers have a chance to counter the
reciprocity by themselves offering to engage in reciprocity, or by
offering alternative terms. Where a truck manufacturer, however, has
other divisions with paint requirements and some of his competitors
do not, his added purchasing power may give him leverage in the sale
of his trucks which can lead to foreclosure of part of the truck market
from his less favorably situated competitors.
Assuming that the truck manufacturer has some purchasing
"power," generated by his need for paint, it is not obvious why he
would choose to use this power in order to sell more trucks rather than
to obtain paint on better terms. Rational minimization of costs and
maximization of profit would seem to dictate bargaining for cheaper
paint. A common sense explanation could be that the paint supplier
is unwilling to cut his prices, so the reciprocally tied sale of trucks
would be the only advantage the truck manufacturer could get. This
explanation has been put in a more sophisticated manner:
In markets of relatively few firms . . . sellers recognize their
mutual interdependence; each of the individual firms, knowing
that its own price decisions can influence the industrywide price
level, carefully avoids price competition. These firms have, there-
fore, a powerful incentive to use the various nonprice strategies
to promote sales, e.g., advertising, promotion, innovation, tying
arrangements, and reciprocal selling. The latter practice, as noted,
is most prominent in particular industrial settings and generally
can be practiced most successfully by conglomerate firms.4
The nonprice strategy of reciprocity can be used to grant or secure a
discount or concession without disturbing formal market pricing. That
is, if a purchaser pays more than he needs to pay, he is, in effect, giving
a discount on the reciprocal purchases from him. Thus, reciprocity
can be used not only as a means for avoiding the Robinson-Patman
Act rule against price discrimination, 5 but also as a means of prolong-
ing price rigidity in the marketplace.
The way reciprocity can work is best illustrated by viewing it
through the eyes of a potential participant. The businessman may well
believe that he can use his purchasing power to gain more sales with-
out cost to him. Using the example of the truck manufacturer, he
probably thinks that he is in business to sell trucks, not to buy paint.
4. Mueller, The Rising Economic Concentration in America: Reciprocity,
Conglomeration and the New American 'Zaibatsu' System II, 4 ANTITRUST L. &
ECON. Rzv. 91 (Summer 1971) at 92.
5. 15 U.S.C. § 13 (1970).
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He may believe that he is already getting sufficient service and quality
in his paint purchases, and that the paint supplier could improve
neither the service nor the quality of the paint even if he should
desire to do so. More important, the truck manufacturer is likely to
believe that the price he is paying for paint is competitive and that
his chances of selling trucks to his paint supplier are much better
than his chances of effecting a break in the market price of paint.
Our hypothetical businessman also knows that the sale of a truck
based on reciprocity is more profitable to him than the sale of one
at the same price to a non-reciprocal customer, because sales expense
almost disappears as the customer becomes a "house account." More-
over, reciprocal prices tend to be higher initially and to increase over
time because of the captive nature of the account. Outsiders become
reluctant to quote as they learn that they cannot share in the business,
regardless of the price they quote. They think that the maximum
they may accomplish is to force their competitor, who has a lock on
the business, to lower his price. Such a result is viewed as merely
depressing the profitability of their own industry, in other words, as
an act which is not "constructive," and which might well precipitate
a program of vindictive price-cutting. Although the businessman
selling his trucks on reciprocity may realize that in the future he will
probably experience the same problems in obtaining paint at a com-
petitive price that his customer is presently experiencing in purchasing
trucks, he is likely to conclude that his immediate increase in sales
justifies the risk.
The effects of reciprocity may not always be undesirable. Open
price, quality and service competition is desirable because it moves
toward better allocation of resources and maximization of business
efficiency. But it must be admitted that price competition is not per-
fectly operative in our economy, and reciprocity may tend to promote
economic efficiency in stable price situations. As already noted, one
economic effect of reciprocity in a given situation may be that a buyer
gets an indirect discount on purchases. In our hypothetical example,
the truck manufacturer could be viewed as buying paint more cheaply
rather than as selling more trucks. Moreover, if our hypothetical truck
manufacturer has considerable unused capacity, expansion of his sales
without cutting his standard price may be economically beneficial,
whether he uses more salesmen, advertising, reciprocity, merger or
some other technique.6
6. For a fuller treatment of the possible economic benefits see Markovits,
Tie-ins, Reciprocity, and the Leverage Theory, 76 YALE L.J. 1397, 1399-1443 (1967).
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The legal relevance of such economic considerations is not clear.
The antitrust laws, because they are enforced through decisions of
lawyer-judges, probably cannot be overly concerned with fine points of
economic analysis, even if the applicable economic theories were con-
sistent and the economic data available.7 By legal standards, there is
a good case for the anti-competitive effect of reciprocity. Not only
does it seem to exclude some competitors from the market unfairly
and uneconomically, s but it also encourages bigness, diversification
and conglomeration.9
ANTITRUST DECISIONS INVOLVING RECIPROCITY
Although it is generally considered a modern restraint of trade,
coercive reciprocity was proscribed by the Federal Trade Commission
(FTC) in a series of actions in the 1930's.1O Despite the widespread
practice of reciprocity since then, these early cases were not followed
by further enforcement efforts. The issue of reciprocity was not
brought to the fore again until the Supreme Court discussed it in
1965 in a case applying section 7 of the Clayton Act." In FTC v.
Consolidated Foods Corp.,2 the Commission held illegal a merger
between Consolidated, which bought large quantities of goods from
the food processing industry, and Gentry, Inc., a major supplier of
dehydrated onion and garlic to the food processing industry. The
Commission found that the acquisition of Gentry provided "the advan-
tage of a mixed threat and lure of reciprocal buying in its competi-
tion for business and 'the power to foreclose competition from a
substantial share of the markets for dehydrated onion and garlic.' "18
7. See D. DEWEY, THE THEORY OF IMPERFECT COMPETITION: A RADICAL RE-
CONSTRUCTION 142-64 (1969), for the proposition that the economic impact of particular
business decisions is not now provable.
8. Donnem, The Antitrust Attack on Reciprocity and Reciprocity Effect, 38
A.B.A. ANTITRUST L.J. 637 (1969).
9. See generally G. STOCKING, WORKABLE COMPETITION AND ANTITRUST POLICY
294-95, 297-304, 315-18 (1961).
10. Waugh Equip. Co., 15 F.T.C. 232 (1931); Mechanical Mfg. Co., 16 F.T.C. 67
(1932); California Packing Corp., 25 F.T.C. 379 (1937). In those cases, the FTC
branded coercive reciprocity as one of the "unfair methods of competition" made
unlawful by section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, ch. 311, § 5, 38 Stat. 719
(1914), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 45 (1970). Until 1972, it was generally thought
that unfair trade practices under section 5, which is not strictly an antitrust act,
embraced only practices which violated other antitrust laws, or would do so if there
were a conspiracy to engage in the proscribed practices. A broader interpretation of
section 5 was adopted in FTC v. Sperry & Hutchinson Co., 405 U.S. 233 (1972).
11. 15 U.S.C. § 18 (1970).
12. 380 U.S. 592 (1965).
13. Id. at 593.
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The Supreme Court, citing its section 1 tie-in cases,1" upheld the
Commission's decision, stating that reciprocity "results in 'an irrele-
vant and alien factor' . . . intruding into the choice among competing
products, creating at the least 'a priority on the business at equal
prices.' 1'5 Except for this broad language, the decision will not be
particularly helpful in future reciprocity cases, for the case presented
an extreme situation of essentially coercive use of reciprocity by a
seller having much greater buying power than his competitors and
having a large or dominant share of the restrained selling market. 6
The element of buying power relative to competitors in the re-
ciprocal selling market was emphasized by the Court of Appeals for
the Third Circuit in Allis-Chalmers Manufacturing Co. v. White Con-
solidated Industries, Inc.' In that private action brought to prevent
a takeover of Allis-Chalmers, the court reversed the denial of a pre-
liminary injunction on several grounds. One ground was that a part
of the business of the merged company was to be the sale of rolling
mills by its Blaw-Knox division to the steel industry; finding that "a
White-Allis combination would buy a far larger amount of steel than any
of Blaw-Knox's competitors in the rolling mill market,"'" the court
concluded that a substantial basis existed for the challenge to the
merger because of opportunities for reciprocity. The finding of rela-
tive power vis-i-vis existing competitors by the Commission in Con-
solidated Foods and by the court in Allis-Chalmers focused on the
most visible anti-competitive effect of reciprocity, namely, the fore-
closure of markets through bigness and conglomeration.
In recent non-merger actions, the Justice Department has obtained
a large number of consent decrees prohibiting corporate defendants
from engaging in reciprocity.' 9 To date, however, no Government
complaint claiming a section 1 Sherman Act violation based on re-
ciprocity in a non-merger setting has produced a court decision on the
Government's theory of illegality.
Reciprocity was expressly placed within the category of restraints
deemed per se unreasonable by the district court in United States v.
General Dynamics Corp.2" In that case, the Government sought divesti-
ture by General Dynamics of its Liquid Carbonics Division on claimed
14. Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1 (1958), discussed at notes
83-87 infra; International Salt Co. v. United States, 332 U.S. 392 (1947).
15. 380 U.S. at 594.
16. Id. at 595.
17. 414 F.2d 506 (3d Cir. 1969).
18. Id. at 518.
19. For a discussion of those cases see text accompanying notes 74 & 75 infra.
20. 258 F. Supp. 36 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
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violations of sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. The Government's
contention that the agreement to merge constituted a violation of sec-
tion 1 was accepted by the court. As to the claim that defendant's
contracts with its customers based on reciprocity violated section 1,
the court concluded that reciprocity is sufficiently analogous to "tying"'
to make the practice per se illegal provided a "not insubstantial" amount
of commerce is restrained.22 It also stated that it made no difference
whether the reciprocity was coercive or non-coercive. The court ruled
that evidence that General Dynamics had systematically interjected
reciprocity into its sales presentations and that its suppliers did, in
fact, buy large quantities of goods from General Dynamics was not
sufficient to support a finding of illegality under section 1. Rejecting
the circumstantial evidence of substantial reciprocity, the court looked
only at the specific purchases from General Dynamics which were
proven to have resulted from reciprocity. The court held that the sub-
stantiality requirement for illegality was not met by aggregate pur-
chases by two suppliers amounting to $177,225.
Columbia Nitrogen Corp. v. Royster Co.' is the only reported
case in which a private litigant has sought treble damages based on
alleged reciprocity. Plaintiff sued for breach of contract and defendant
relied on its reciprocal purchasing agreement with plaintiff both as an
affirmative defense and, by way of counterclaim, as a basis for dam-
ages. The jury did not find coercion, and the court rejected defendant's
claims without reaching the question of the legality of non-coercive
reciprocity.24 In holding that a willing participant cannot recover, the
court stated: "We think it plain, therefore, that a party, who volun-
tarily formulates and equally participates in a non-coercive agreement
for reciprocal dealing until a declining market makes its purchases
unprofitable, cannot maintain an action under § 1 of the Sherman Act
against its trading partner.' '2 5
21. See page 111 infra.
22. 258 F. Supp. at 66. The court had so held in its prior opinion denying
defendant's motion to dismiss. United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 246 F. Supp.
156 (S.D.N.Y. 1965).
23. 451 F.2d 3 (4th Cir. 1971).
24. Since the reciprocal practices had terminated by the time Royster brought the
action, the court had no need to consider the enforceability of the allegedly illegal
agreement, and it expressly stated that it was not deciding whether a non-coercive
reciprocity agreement was illegal under section 1 of the Sherman Act. It also
expressed "no opinion on whether . . . a person not a party to the reciprocal dealing,
could maintain an action under § 1 . . . based on the agreement between Royster
and Columbia." Id. at 14 n.19.
25. Id. at 16.
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CONTRACT, COMBINATION OR CONSPIRACY
The Columbia Nitrogen opinion considered and properly distin-
guished the decision of the Supreme Court in Perma Life Mufflers, Inc.
v. International Parts Corp.2 In that case Midas Muffler franchisees
were seeking damages for monetary losses allegedly caused by illegally
restrictive terms in their franchise agreements. They alleged a con-
spiracy between International Parts Corporation, three of its wholly
owned subsidiaries and six individual officers or agents of the corpora-
tions to restrain trade in violation of section 1 of the Sherman Act
and section 3 of the Clayton Act.27 The court of appeals affirmed the
district court's judgment for defendants on two grounds. First, since
plaintiffs had entered into the illegal agreements, they were in pari
delicto and thus could not recover from their joint wrongdoers. Second,
there was no showing of a combination or conspiracy, because the
defendants were all part of one business entity which could not con-
spire with itself. The Supreme Court reversed.
Seven members of the -Court (in four opinions) concluded that
the facts established that plaintiffs did not so participate in the illegality
as to be barred from recovery. When the several concurring opinions
are combined! with Justice Black's opinion for the plurality of four,
the case clearly holds that the technical doctrine of in pari delicto,
"with its complex scope, contents, and effects, is not to be recognized
as a defense to an antitrust action."218 The broad principle underlying
the doctrine, however, was not totally rejected. Justice Black said
that he was not deciding whether "truly complete involvement and
participation in a monopolistic scheme could ever be a basis, wholly
apart from the idea of in pari delicto, for barring a plaintiff's cause of
action."' 29 The five justices who concurred or concurred and dissented
went further. Although the logical foundations for their conclusions
are different, the net effect of the various opinions is a rule that when
a plaintiff is the moving force or an equal force in establishing the
restraint, he cannot recover. Thus the holding in Columbia Nitrogen
that an equal participant in non-coercive reciprocity cannot recover was
correct under the Perma Life Muffler decision.30
26. 392 U.S. 134 (1968).
27. An allegation of illegal price discrimination under the Robinson-Patman Act
was not involved in the appeal to the Supreme Court.
28. 392 U.S. at 140.
29. Id.
30. In addition to the Columbia Nitrogen decision, see Premier Elec. Constr.
Co. v. Miller Davis Co., 422 F.2d 1132, 1138 (7th Cir. 1970). There can, of course,
be variations on this theme. For example, in American Mfrs. Mut. Ins. Co. v.
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Justice Black's discussion of the conspiracy issue, however, con-
fuses the application of this new equal fault rule. Justice Black first
held that a corporation and its wholly owned subsidiary can be found
to have combined or conspired under section 1 of the Sherman Act."'
He went on to suggest alternative conspiracy theories, stating that a
finding of combination could equally well be based on the particular
franchise agreement between one plaintiff and the defendant Midas,
Inc., or on the agreements between Midas and the other franchise
dealers "whose acquiescence in Midas' firmly enforced restraints was
induced by 'the communicated danger of termination.' "32 Justice
Harlan, joined by Justice Stewart, dissented on the ground that there
were unresolved fact questions as to the equality of the participation
of plaintiffs. He noted that the application of the bar of in pari delicto
may be proper where the illegal combination is an agreement between
the plaintiff and defendant, but improper where the illegal combination
or conspiracy is found elsewhere and the plaintiff merely "knowingly
allowed an offense to be committed against him.""
Certainly under Justice Harlan's approach, and probably under
the more general rules of the other opinions, the application of the new
equal fault rule could turn on who is found to have conspired or
combined in the particular case. If a reciprocity case plaintiff relies
on the combination between himself and his trading partner, then the
Columbia Nitrogen result is very likely. Typically, each party initially
and recurringly during the continuation of the reciprocal dealing makes
an uncoerced decision that he can profit by the relationship. To use a
word employed by Justice Harlan in Perma Life Muffler, it would be
"bizarre ' 3 4 for such a willing party to a reciprocal purchasing arrange-
ment to recover. If, on the other hand, the focus is on a combination
or conspiracy between defendant and its subsidiaries, or defendant
and other suppliers, the bar of equal fault is not so obviously applicable.
A large buyer who enters into reciprocity agreements with a number
American Broadcasting-Paramount Theatres, Inc., 446 F.2d 1131 (2d Cir. 1971),
the court affirmed the dismissal of a tie-in case on the ground that the plaintiff
had acted unreasonably in failing to negotiate further to eliminate the unwanted
contractual provisions.
31. Accord, Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, 340 U.S. 211
(1951). The policy of the Department of Justice has been to apply this rule only
where "the practice has a coercive or restrictive effect on outsiders." Letter from
Richard W. McLaren, Assistant Attorney General, Antitrust Division, to Thomas J.
O'Connell, Feb. 22, 1971, 1972 TRADE REG. REP. ff 50,122 at 55,197.
32. 392 U.S. at 142, quoting United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S.
365, 372 (1967).




of suppliers could, under one of Justice Black's theories, be held to be
engaged in a combination with all of them, and it is arguable that no
one of the individual supplier-participants is participating in such
larger combination equally with the large buyer.
Justice Black's rule allowing free choice of alternative -theories of
combination may not yet be firmly embedded in the law. The diffi-
culties with the rule are illustrated by Albrecht v. Herald Co., 5 in
which the freewheeling approach to finding combination led to the
plaintiff recovering for invasion of his exclusive territory by defendant,
even though the Court seemed to assume that the exclusivity was
illegal. Future cases may elucidate the relationship between the theory
of combination or conspiracy and the restraints and damages in anti-
trust cases; this article, like Justice Harlan in Perma Life Mufflers,
makes "no attempt to drain the bog at this point.""6 Suffice it to say
that a party to a reciprocity agreement has a better chance of avoiding
the equal fault defense if he establishes a conspiracy between his trading
partner and someone else, such as his partner's parent corporation, to
engage in the reciprocity.
Regardless of where the combination or conspiracy is to be found,
the plaintiff must offer evidence of its existence. Assuming that the
intra-enterprise conspiracy doctrine is not available, 7 it may often be
difficult for either the Government or a private plaintiff to obtain
direct evidence of an agreement to engage in reciprocal purchasing.
Especially since the initiation of the Government's campaign against
reciprocity, it is likely that reciprocal purchasing arrangements will be
subtly developed and essentially tacit. The conclusion of one courts"
that tacit reciprocity cannot violate section 1 may overstate the point,
but the general rule is said to be that proof of consciously parallel (or,
35. 390 U.S. 145 (1968).
36. 392 U.S. at 156.
37. When only one corporation is involved, it is usually held that the enterprise
cannot conspire with itself. E.g., Cliff Food Stores, Inc. v. Kroger, Inc., 417 F.2d
203 (5th Cir. 1969) ; Joseph E. Seagram & Sons v. Hawaiian Oke & Liquors, Ltd.,
416 F.2d 71 (9th Cir. 1969) (reversing the trial court's finding of an intra-enterprise
conspiracy), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 1062 (1970) ; cf. Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S.
145 (1968) (hiring independent agent to further price fixing scheme held to constitute
combination). But see Handler, Through the Antitrust Looking Glass - Twenty-
First Annual Antitrust Review, 57 CALIF. L. REv. 182, 185 (1969); Symposium:
United States v. General Tire and Rubber Company: Intracorporate Conspiracy and
Sherman Act Reciprocity, 36 A.B.A. ANTITRUST L.J. 102, 122 (1967); Unincorpo-
rated Divisions of a Single Corporation Are Legally Capable of Conspiring Among
Themselves in Violation of Section 1 of the Sherman Act, 43 NOTRE DAME LAW. 786
(1968).
38. United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 258 F. Supp. 36 (S.D.N.Y. 1966).
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here, consciously reciprocal) action is, without more, not sufficient to
sustain a finding of contract, combination or conspiracy. 9
The Supreme Court's pronouncements on the sufficiency of cir-
cumstantial evidence to prove contract, combination or conspiracy are
clouded by the fact that two of the key decisions, Theatre Enterprises,
Inc. v. Paramount Film Distributing Corp.4 0 and Interstate Circuit,
Inc. v. United States,41 merely upheld the findings of fact in the trial
courts.4 The Court's 1969 decision in Norfolk Monument Co. v.
Woodlawn Memorial Gardens, Inc.,43 however, was not such a de-
cision and may indicate that little, if any, evidence is required to
support a finding of combination or conspiracy. In that case, both the
district court and the court of appeals held that summary judgment
for defendants was proper because extensive discovery had produced
no evidence of a conspiracy to exclude the plaintiff from the market
for bronze grave markers. The Supreme Court reversed. In deciding
that the case should go to trial, the Court could simply have relied on
its usual rule rejecting summary procedures in antitrust cases." In-
stead, it affirmatively concluded that "there remained material issues
of fact which could only be resolved by the jury after a plenary trial." '
Briefly, the facts, as established through pretrial discovery, were
that one defendant manufactured and sold bronze grave markers; the
other five defendants were operators of cemeteries which had rules
which made it unlikely that their customers would buy grave markers
from anyone except the cemetery operator. The manufacturer-defendant
supplied the bulk of operator-defendants' requirements for bronze
markers, and by the circulation of a pamphlet encouraged the tie-in
practices of the operator-defendants. The complaint alleged that de-
fendants had jointly adopted various restrictive devices to prevent and
restrict sales by plaintiff, a retailer of bronze grave markers.
The per curiam Supreme Court opinion stated at one point that
the Court was holding "only that the alleged conspiracy had not been
conclusively disproved by pretrial discovery." 46 However, the opinion
39. For a conclusion that nothing much more can be said about the law in this
troubling area see A.B.A. SECTION OF ANTITRUST, ANTITRUST DEVELOPMENTS 1955-
1968 (1968), at 22-24.
40. 346 U.S. 537 (1954).
41. 306 U.S. 208 (1939).
42. But cf. Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968) (finding combination
and liability contrary to the jury verdict).
43. 394 U.S. 700 (1969).
44. The benchmark case on this rule is Poller v. Columbia Broadcasting Sys.,
368 U.S. 464 (1962) ; cf. First Nat'l Bank v. Cities Service Co., 391 U.S. 253 (1968).




had earlier made it clear that its reversal was not dependent upon the
absence of additional evidence. The Court said, in effect, that if a
manufacturer encourages his customers to do their own retailing with
the expectation of getting more of their business, then the jury is
entitled to draw the inference of a conspiracy between the manufacturer
and the various customers who decided that they could make more
money by doing their own retailing. In support of this non sequitur,
the Court cited the statement in the Theatre Enterprises case that
"business behavior is admissible circumstantial evidence from which
the fact finder may infer agreement. '4 7 The current Director of the
Bureau of Competition of the Federal Trade Commission, Alan S.
Ward, has commented that "Norfolk Monument and similar conscious
parallelism cases refleot a willingness to penalize essentially unilateral
conduct under certain circumstances, that is, where proof of restraint
is strong though proof of any agreement is weak."4
Certainly in the area of resale price maintenance, the Court has
gone far toward abolishing the requirement of proof of agreement.49
Announcement by a seller of a policy that "we will deal with you only
if . . ..." and subsequent acquiescence in that policy contrary to the
isolated self-interest of the buyer do suggest conventional notions of
implied contract or acceptance of an offer by action. Perhaps such an
announcement of policy is what Ward had in mind when he spoke of
strong proof of restraint.
On the other hand, if Norfolk Monument means that conscious
parallelism alone is sufficient to prove conspiracy even when there are
legitimate business reasons for each partner to undertake the parallel
actions, it permits an improper inference. The only logical rule for
finding agreement from consciously parallel behavior was that stated
in Interstate Circuit: such an inference is permitted where each party
"knew that cooperation was essential to successful operation of the
plan." 50 As Professor Turner has so persuasively demonstrated, it
must be shown that the decisions of the conspirators were interde-
pendent.5' This proper, limited rule would allow a finding of combina-
47. Id., quoting Theatre Enterprises, Inc. v. Paramount Film Distrib. Corp., 346
U.S. 537, 540 (1954).
48. Ward, Contract, Combination and Conspiracy, 38 A.B.A. ANTITRUST L.J. 627,
630 (1969).
49. E.g., Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145 (1968) ; United States v. Parke
Davis & Co., 362 U.S. 29 (1960) ; Kiefer-Stewart Co. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons,
340 U.S. 211 (1951).
50. 306 U.S. 208, 226 (1939). See also FTC v. Cement Institute, 333 U.S. 683
(1948).
51. Turner, The Definition of Agreement under the Sherman Act: Conscious
Parallelism and Refusals to Deal, 75 HARV. L. REV. 655 (1962).
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tion in many tacit reciprocity cases. Where there is proof that the
parties could have purchased equal goods from others at lower prices,
and especially where one or both panties are charging the other more
than they are charging third parties for the same goods, then the infer-
ence that they have combined or agreed to the reciprocal purchases is
logical. Otherwise, why would one or both have paid the higher
prices? The credibility of rebuttal evidence that the higher prices on
reciprocal purchases were an accidental result of decisions based on
short-term considerations of quality and service or long-term consider-
ations of price, quality and service would probably have to be weighed
by the trier of fact. The once common practice of one or both parties
compiling and distributing to their purchasing departments statistics
identifying the companies' customers5" might not itself establish a
joint motive;53 but such evidence would make testimony that the pur-
chasing decisions were made on the basis of considerations of long-range
quality and service far less credible.
INJURY AND DAMAGES
Antitrust cases- distinguish injury from damages and impose a
stricter burden of proof as to injury than as to damages. The dual
standard has been stated as follows:
The cases have drawn a distinction between the quantum of proof
necessary to show the fact as distinguished from the amount of
damage; the burden as to the former is the more stringent one.
In other words, the fact of injury must first be shown before the
jury is allowed to estimate the amount of damage. 4
Where the reciprocity involves higher prices, and a competitor has
unsuccessfully sought the business on more favorable terms, the fact
of injury to both the excluded competitor and the overcharged par-
ticipant might be thought to be obvious, and the more stringent burden
of proof as to injury easy to meet. 5 For example, suppose that the
52. The practice is enjoined under some current consent decrees. See text
accompanying note 74 infra.
53. See United States v. General Dynamics Corp., 258 F. Supp. 36, 66 (S.D.N.Y.
1966) ; United States v. Ingersoll-Rand Co., 218 F. Supp. 530, 552 (W.D. Pa. 1963).
54. Flintkote Company v. Lysfjord, 246 F.2d 368, 392 (9th Cir.), cert denied,
355 U.S. 835 (1957). This rule was laid down by the Supreme Court in Story
Parchment Co. v. Patterson Parchment Paper Co., 282 U.S. 555 (1931).
55. It might be argued that a competitor precluded from making sales by reason
of coercive reciprocity cannot recover because he was not within the target area
and thus has no standing under section 4. See Wright, Legal Cause in Treble Damage
Actions Under the Clayton Act, 27 MD. L. REv. 275 (1967). This judicially developed
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price paid in a reciprocal arrangement is $5,000 per truck and that a
third party competitor was willing to sell an equal truck for $4,500.
It would seem that the purchaser of the truck has been injured to the
extent of $500 (less his profit on reciprocal sales to the truck manu-
facturer which he otherwise would not have made) and that the third
party competitor has been injured to the extent of his lost profit.
Unless he is to be shielded from the consequences of his bargain,
however, a party to a reciprocity arrangement should seldom, if ever,
be deemed to be injured by the arrangement. A party does not make
a bargain unless he thinks that the benefits to him will at least equal
the detriments. The necessity of considering the provable benefit to the
plaintiff who claims he was overcharged was recently recognized in
the analogous tie-in area. In Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc.,56 the
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the price paid for a
tie-in package, not just the higher prices on the tied products, had to
be considered in determining the damages of the plaintiff franchisee.
Plaintiff had paid nothing for the tying product, namely, the right to
use defendant's trade name. With the nature of the tie-in bargain so
starkly visible, the court held that the value of the use of the name
should be offset against the allegedly higher prices paid for the
tied products.
The reasoning of that decision should apply in most or all recipro-
city cases. Parties who enter into a reciprocal bargain must believe it
will benefit them, and the law should not relieve them of the conse-
quences. In the Consolidated Foods case," for example, suppliers of
Consolidated were apparently induced to take inferior dehydrated
garlic. However, it is likely that they recouped this economic detriment
through their reciprocal sales to Consolidated.
The Perma Life Muffler case,5" although involving the somewhat
different problem of offsetting benefits to an antitrust plaintiff, casts
some doubt on the legal applicability of the foregoing mutual benefit
rule barring recovery by remotely injured parties serves, in part, to prevent double
recovery. In Hanover Shoe, Inc. v. United Shoe Machine Corp., 392 U.S. 481
(1968), it was held that the fact that the plaintiff had passed on the overcharge
did not bar his recovery. Unless there is to be double recovery, those to whom the
cost was passed on cannot recover. See Analysis, ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. No.
547, B-1 (1972). No double recovery would result from allowing both injured parties
to recover in a reciprocity case.
56. 448 F.2d 43, 52 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 955 (1972). The court,
however, did not abandon its holding in Lessig v. Tidewater Oil Co., 327 F.2d 459,
471 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 993 (1964), that the overcharge establishes
"prima facie, that [the buyer] has been damaged."
57. See text accompanying notes 12-16 supra.
58. Discussed at notes 26-33 supra.
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analysis. The Supreme Court's opinions in that case rejected the
notion that because the plaintiffs had made a good profit from their
Midas franchises they could not recover. Implicit in this holding must
have been the assumption that damages to a franchisee are not to be
measured by how much better off he would have been had he not en-
tered the relationship. Instead, the legal and illegal parts of the franchise
arrangement are to be separated, with damages being the losses result-
ing from the illegal part. Justice Black recognized that this could
result in a windfall gain, but found that the interest of enforcing the
antitrust laws justified the result. He did say, however, that "[t]he
possible beneficial byproducts of a restriction from a plaintiff's point of
view can of course be taken into consideration in computing damages.''"
If a similar approach of separating the legal from the illegal parts
of the agreement were applied to reciprocity, a party to the reciprocity
might be able to retain the benefits of his increased sales while recover-
ing, trebled, the excessive amount paid for the reciprocally tied product.
Such a rule would ignore the unitary nature of a reciprocal purchas-
ing agreement and would create a legal incentive to engage in, rather
than refrain from, reciprocity. The economic harm of reciprocity is
the foreclosure of competitors, and the person who engages in recipro-
city is furthering that harm. Unlike the usual franchisee, who may
have made a long term investment and, thus, finds it expensive to
refuse to comply with illegal restrictions and be terminated, the party
to reciprocity would very seldom have an investment peculiar to the
reciprocal arrangement, so his continued participation in the scheme
must be motivated by expected benefit. In other words, the benefit from
increased sales or from sales at higher prices should at least be deemed
to be a benefit from the restraint to be offset against the damages to
the party to the reciprocity within the Perma Life Muffler dictum."0
Competitors who have been foreclosed from making sales because
of reciprocity may also encounter difficulties in proving injury. Com-
petitors who have had the business and lost it would have the best
chance of establishing injury.6' When a proven supplier is replaced
59. 392 U.S. at 140.
60. Assuming that the Perma Life Mufflers doctrine of equal fault is applied,
there should be no cases of claim and counterclaim based on the mutual overcharges.
Unusual situations might occur where one party to the reciprocity could prove
consequential damages.
61. A decline in sales and profits coinciding with the imposition of the restraint
is an accepted basis for showing injury and damages, and the loss of specific sales
is even more convincing. E.g., Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 327 U.S. 251
(1946) ; Eastman Kodak Co. v. Southern Photo Materials Co., 273 U.S. 359 (1927).
The rule of Nelson Radio & Supply Co. v. Motorola, Inc., 200 F.2d 911 (5th Cir.
1952), cert. denied, 345 U.S. 925 (1953), that a terminated distributor could not
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on orders from top management for purposes of exercising reciprocity,
someone in the buyer's purchasing department may make statements to
the replaced supplier to the effect that the loss of business is in no way
attributable to factors of price, service or quality. Such statements, to-
gether with purchase orders and invoices available through normal dis-
covery procedures, should go far toward establishing the fact of injury.
Proof of injury will be more difficult for competitors who only
anticipated doing business with one of the parties to the reciprocal
agreement. The typical antitrust case in which the claimed damages
are lost profits on anticipated sales involves a loss of sales to the
general public due to some act of defendant. In such situations, courts
have approved various methods of estimating the lost sales and profits.6"
Those cases holding that particular evidence sufficiently established a
reasonable probability that some approximate amount of sales would
have been made to unknown buyers indicate that there should be ways
for a reciprocity plaintiff to prove that, absent the restraint, he would
have sold some amount to a particular buyer. In fact, several decisions
have upheld damage awards based on losses of sales to particular buyers.
In Richfield Oil Corp. v. Karseal Corp.,3 defendant Richfield
had illegally prevented its service stations from purchasing Karseal's
wax, which generally outsold all competing products. The court of
appeals noted that plaintiff's counsel "realistically approached the prob-
lem and presented to the jury a realistic formula ' 64 for computing the
lost sales and affirmed the judgment on the verdict for the lost profits.
That case could be distinguished from the typical reciprocity case,
however, because plaintiff's formula was based on a prediction of
purchases by the general public, with the assumption that the service
stations would have, if not restrained, met the public demand. Essen-
tially the standard was one of comparing sales of like businesses not
recover because he could not prove a contract, combination or conspiracy, has been
made obsolete by the more sophisticated theories of combination and conspiracy
enunciated by the Supreme Court in Albrecht v. Herald Co., 390 U.S. 145, 150 and n.6
(1968) and Perma Life Mufflers, Inc. v. International Parts Corp., 392 U.S. 134, 142
(1968).
62. See Clark, The Treble Damage Bonanza: New Doctrines of Damages in
Private Antitrust Suits, 52 MicH. L. REv. 363 (1954). The principal methods are
comparison of plaintiff's actual sales and profit or loss with (1) plaintiff's profits
prior to the restraint [Bigelow v. RKO Radio Pictures, Inc., 327 U.S. 251 (1946)],
(2) profits of a comparable business not subject to the restraint [Milwaukee Towne
Corp. v. Loew's, Inc., 190 F.2d 561 (7th Cir. 1951), cert. denied, 342 U.S. 909 (1952)],
and (3) plaintiff's profits after the restraint was lifted [see Herman Schwabe, Inc.,
v. United Shoe Mach, Corp., 297 F.2d 906 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 369 U.S. 965
(1962)].
63. 271 F.2d 709 (9th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 961 (1960).
64. 1d. at 715.
[VOL. XXXII
RECIPROCITY AND THE PRIVATE PLAINTIFF
subject to the restraint. In the typical reciprocity case, the question is
the probability of sales to a particular buyer, and general sales statistics
may not be helpful.
The other two decisions approving recovery of profits on lost
potential sales are not distinguishable on such a ground. In Advance
Business Systems & Supply Co. v. SCM Corp.,6 5 involving a tie of
paper to copying machines, the court did not discuss the evidence of
damages but did affirm as not clearly erroneous the non-jury award
of damages for " 'the small loss of specific sales which plaintiff proved
and the probable loss of some sales of paper for use with the few
Model 55 machines proved to have been on copy service in Balti-
more.'"66 The applicability of this holding to other cases, however,
might be limited by the finding that the plaintiff offered "approxi-
mately 90% of the competition SCM encountered in the sale of elec-
trostatic paper in Maryland. '67 In such a situation, where the plaintiff
is virtually the only alternative source of supply, it should be easiest
to establish the probability of lost sales.
The decision which should be most helpful to the excluded com-
petitor-plaintiff is Rangen, Inc. v. Sterling Nelson & Sons,6" in which
liability was imposed under the brokerage section of the Robinson-
Patman Act. 9 Plaintiff's competitor, Rangen, had made payments to a
state official to secure preferential treatment in the purchase of fishfood
by the state. Including the two parties, there were eight companies who
were potential suppliers of fishfood to the state. During an extended
period, in which Rangen was the state's sole supplier, and was making
substantial payments to the purchasing agent individually, the plain-
tiff's solicitations of the state's business at list prices lower than the
prices the state was paying were unsuccessful. After the illegal payments
stopped, the state accepted competitive bids for its fishfood require-
ments, and plaintiff, as the low bidder, was awarded the first contract.
As might be expected, plaintiff's list prices, although lower than defend-
ant's prices to the state, were higher than defendant's operative prices
to others. On the basis of these facts, the court of appeals affirmed
the award below of damages based on the finding that plaintiff prob-
ably would have supplied approximately one-fourth of the state's
65. 415 F.2d 55 (4th Cir. 1969).
66. Id. at 69.
67. Id. at 60.
68. 351 F.2d 851 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 383 U.S. 936 (1966).
69. 15 U.S.C. § 13(c) (1970). This unusual application of the brokerage section
of the Robinson-Patman Act was cited by the Supreme Court, seemingly with




requirements if it had not been for the illegal payments. It further
held that the use of plaintiff's list prices to compute the damages was
not error, even though the competitive prices would likely have been
lower, on the ground that it was enough that plaintiff's list prices were
lower than defendant's prices to the state.
Thert is great similarity between the facts in Rangen and the
typical reciprocity situation. As was noted earlier, one characteristic
of reciprocal trade arrangements is that prices, particularly those
charged by the party doing more reciprocal buying than selling, tend
to be higher than those prevailing in the open market. Another char-
acteristic of such an arrangement is that usually there is more than
one reciprocity supplier for a given item, with the market share for
each such supplier being negotiated with the reciprocal customer. A
third characteristic is that all suppliers who have successfully negotiated
a reciprocal share tend to sell the commodity at identical prices.
Where the plaintiff possesses the capacity to offer equal service
and quality, repeated unsuccessful solicitation of the business in ques-
tion at a lower price may be enough to establish injury.70 Such evi-
dence would be even more convincing if the potential customer had
requested quotations from the plaintiff. Such a case is not unlikely.
If a party to reciprocity who is paying the higher price is to retain
what he considers to be the benefits of conducting business in this
manner he is not free to replace any of his reciprocal suppliers for
reasons of price. But he may well seek outside price quotations for
use in bargaining with his reciprocal suppliers. Typically, such a
quotation is requested from a party who the potential customer believes
is capable of performing adequately in regard to service and quality.
It is to be expected that unless the non-reciprocal potential supplier
quotes high purposely, because he has no expectation of securing any
business, he will follow up his quotation with sales calls and will seek
information as to the competitive level of his prices. Such price in-
formation is normally available to an experienced businessman. It is
at this point, assuming that he has quoted prices lower than those
charged by the reciprocal suppliers, and assuming further that such
suppliers will not meet his prices, that the potential supplier develops
a reasonable expectation of doing business. At a trial, the potential
customer would be hard put to say that his request for price quotation
was made only to obtain a comparison, with no expectation of placing
an order, since such a statement would tend to prove the existence of
70. The injury could as easily be proven where the price is the same but the
quality or service is better.
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the restraint. Similarly, he would be loath to say that such request for
quotation was only one of many made by him to various potential
suppliers, particularly if all the quotations received by him contained
prices lower than those he was paying. There appears to be no reason
why a plaintiff who offers such evidence should not be held to have
established the fact that he has been injured.
Where the plaintiff is claiming as damages only lost profits based
on a former level of sales or on sales reasonably anticipated and not
received, the problem of causal relationship seems minimal. If injury
is established, the causative link to loss of. the business need not be
firmly established to get to the jury. Since Story Parchment Co. v.
Patterson Parchment Paper Co.,7 the Supreme Court has consistently
held that once the plaintiff shows that a violation of the antitrust laws
has occurred and that he has sustained a loss, then if the violation is of
the kind which might well cause the damage, the trier of fact may infer
from available circumstantial evidence that a causal relation existed.72
Although the law does not require much proof as to the amount
of damages, the typical private reciprocity case does present a peculiar
difficulty not usually present in other types of antitrust cases and not
discussed in the Rangen opinion. If there are many potential supplier-
competitor-plaintiffs, then there might be no reasonable limit to the
defendant's potential liability. For example, ten competitors might
each believe that, absent any restraint, he could reasonably expect to be
awarded thirty percent of the business in question. As this would
constitute three times the available business, a trebled award to each
such plaintiff would subject the defendant to liability for nine times
the amount of profit represented by the total purchases involved
This situation, however, calls for a limitation of liability, not a denial
of it. The number of suppliers who sought the business at lower prices
could be used as the basis for determining what proportion would
have gone to any plaintiff, as was done in the Rangen case. Further-
more, excessive recovery would be improbable because it is unlikely
that any later plaintiff could show that he would have received a larger
share of the business.
The alternative to the Rangen approach would be to leave the
enforcement of antitrust policy as it pertains to reciprocity to the
Federal Trade Commission and the Justice Department.73 The numer-
71. 282 U.S. 555 (1931).
72. E.g., Continental Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690,
697 (1962).
73. Another alternative, a class action on behalf of all potential suppliers, is
inappropriate because of the probable conflicts of interest within the class. Such an
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ous consent decrees which have been entered into in reciprocity cases
broadly enjoin not only agreements or understandings to engage in
reciprocity but also unilateral statements to suppliers that a preference
will be given based on the suppliers' purchases and even the mere dis-
cussion with suppliers of the relationship between purchases and sales
between the parties. They further enjoin internal corporate communi-
cation of information which could form the basis for reciprocal pur-
chasing. T4 Two of the consent decrees obtained in 1972 go further,
enjoining even totally unilateral reciprocity.75 In these circumstances,
the Government will be able to establish violation of a reciprocity
consent decree on the basis of facts which would not independently
establish a contract or combination in violation of section 1.
Nevertheless, the limited resources of the Antitrust Division of
the Department of Justice and the FTC and the scanty history of
Government enforcement of antitrust decrees suggest that the addi-
tional tool of private enforcement is still needed to counter effectively
the anti-competitive practice of reciprocity. 6 If a consent decree does,
in fact, result in abandonment of the practice, then no private action
will be maintainable. If, on the other hand, the effect is merely to
stabilize the reciprocal behavior at its level at the time of the Govern-
ment suit or of the decree, or to prevent finely adjusted reciprocal
bargains by limiting the availability of sales and purchase data, the
illegally excluded competitor should be entitled to recover his damages
in a private action.
Private reciprocity actions are peculiarly suited to achieving the
desired end result. As the prospective plaintiff is seeking only the profits
represented by a portion of the business, the defendant, if he happens to
approach may not, in any case, avoid the problem of allocating the lost sales among
the potential suppliers. See Note, Federal Rule 23(b)(3)(D): The Manageability
Requirement In The Treble Damage Consumer Class Action, 31 MD. L. REV. 354
(1971).
74. E.g., United States v. Owens-Illinois, Inc., 1972 Trade Cas. ff 73,828 (N.D.
Ohio 1972); United States v. W. R. Grace & Co., 1972 Trade Cas. ff 73,829 (S.D.N.Y.
1972).
75. United States v. Martin Marietta Corp., 1972 Trade Cas. 73,858 (D. Md.
1972) (clause V(A)) ; United States v. H. K. Porter Co., 1972 Trade Cas. 11 73,917
(W.D. Pa. 1972) (clause V(A)).
The only completely effective bar to reciprocal dealing would be to enjoin
the parties from dealing with each other. Such ultimate relief is being sought by
the FTC in its proposed complaint in In re Southland Corp., File No. 6910076 (F.T.C.
June 2, 1972), 3 TRADE REG. Rs P. (1972 Trade Cas.) 1 20,015.
76. See M. GREEN, B. MOORE & B. WASSERSTEIN, THE CLOSED ENTERPRISE
SYSTEM 179-80 (1972) ; Comment, Antitrust Consent Decrees: A Proposal to Enlist
Private Plaintiffs in Enforcement Efforts, 54 CORNELL L. REv. 763 (1969).
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be the desired customer rather than the competitor, has an easy solution
at hand; give the prospective plaintiff a portion of the business.
LEGAL STANDARDS FOR PER SE ILLEGALITY
The Tie-In Analogy
Reciprocity is one way to establish relatively firm outlets for one's
goods or services. "House accounts" can also be established by such
other means as tie-ins and exclusive dealing agreements. A typical
tie-in is the sale of one product on the condition that the buyer purchase
some other product from the seller. Reciprocity is, like a tie-in, a
partial foreclosure of a market without easily provable economic justi-
fication. Thus the tie-in cases may be crucial in determining under
what circumstances agreements to engage in reciprocity will be deemed
illegal under the antitrust laws. Although the Supreme Court has
suggested that a private plaintiff is always entitled to a day in court
under the rule of reason,77 the discussion here will be limited to the
question of whether and under what circumstances reciprocity is likely
to be held to be "per se illegal," as that term has been used by the
Supreme Court in tie-in cases. 78
77. The rule of reason was elaborated at length by Justice White in Standard
Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911), and United States v. American Tobacco
Co., 221 U.S. 106 (1911). Its most notable application in recent years was in White
Motor Co. v. United States, 372 U.S. 253 (1963), a decision which met a youthful
death in United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S. 365 (1967). In its most
recent tie-in decision, Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394
U.S. 495, 499-500 (1969), the Court held that a private plaintiff should be allowed
an opportunity to prove unreasonableness even if the standards of per se illegality
were not met. It is submitted that this holding of Fortner makes no sense unless
it is intended to allow an opportunity for the plaintiff to show specific intent or
bad means other than the tie-in. Absent such additional elements, the only possible
grounds for unresonableness would exceed the per se standards. See Dam, Fortner
Enterprises v. United States Steel: "Neither a Borrower nor a Lender Be," in 1969
SUP. CT. REv. 1, 32-36 (P. Kurland ed.). Cf. Anderson v. American Auto. Ass'n,
454 F.2d 1240, 1246 (9th Cir. 1972) (case remanded, apparently for trial on motive
and perhaps on whether the agreements were "fairly necessary").
78. E.g., Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495,
498-501 (1969). The Supreme Court's use of the term "per se illegal" in any area
can be a device to avoid the problem of deciding whether a particular agreement
represents price fixing, a boycott or some other forbidden activity. See generally
Rahl, Per Se Rules and Boycotts Under the Sherman Act: Some Reflections on the
Klor's Case, 45 VA. L. REv. 1165 (1959).
In the tie-in cases, however, illegality depends upon a finding of substantiality,
and certain economic justifications may serve to avoid liability. The one clear
"defense" is that there is no other practicable way to protect the good will of the
seller. See Austin, The Tying Arrangement: A Critique and Some New Thoughts,
1967 Wis. L. REV. 88, 113-16. Cf. United States v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co., 388 U.S.
365, 374 (1967) ; Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 330, 331 (1962) ;
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Although tying arrangements can be illegal under both the Sher-
man and Clayton Acts, the private plaintiff seeking damages based on
reciprocity can rely only on the Sherman Act, as was done in the
Columbia Nitrogen case. Section 3 of the Clayton Act deals with a
sale of goods on the condition that the "purchaser thereof shall not
use or deal in the goods . . .of a competitor . . . of the ...seller."79
Reciprocity could be said to be the sale of goods on the condition that
the seller will not deal in the goods of a competitor of the purchaser.
So viewed, reciprocity arguably violates the spirit of section 3, but
there is no way to stretch the language of section 3 to apply to it.8 0
The inapplicability of section 3 to reciprocity may be important.
The rule that the standards for illegality of tie-ins are different under
section 3 of the Clayton Act and section 1 of the Sherman Act was
first announced by the Supreme Court in 1953 in Times-Picayune
Publishing Co. v. United States.8 The Court there held that a tie-in
is illegal under section 1 only if "the seller enjoys a monopolistic
position in the market for the 'tying' product or if a substantial volume
of commerce in the 'tied' product is restrained"; on the other hand,
under section 3 only substantiality of the tied sales is required to estab-
lish illegality."2 In three subsequent cases, the Court has applied the
Times-Picayune standard of illegality of a tie-in under section 1.
In the 1958 case of Northern Pacific Railway Co. v. United
States,8 clauses in deeds and leases of railroad land which required
the grantees and lessees to ship their goods on the Northern Pacific
unless competing routes or modes were cheaper were held to be per se
illegal. The "monopoly power" language of Times-Picayune was con-
strued as not "requiring anything more than sufficient economic power
to impose an appreciable restraint on free competition in the tied
product. '84 Justice Black, writing for the majority, made two argu-
ments for the sufficiency of the evidence of such power. First he
pointed out that some land is uniquely advantageous for some users
of the land. "Not only the testimony of various witnesses," he said,
"but common sense makes it evident that this particular land was often
prized by those who purchased or leased it and was frequently essential
United States v. Jerrold Electronics Corp., 187 F. Supp. 545 (E.D. Pa. 1960), aff'd
mem., 365 U.S. 567 (1961).
79. 15 U.S.C. § 14 (1970).
80. See Hausman, Reciprocal Dealing and the Antitrust Laws, 77 HARV. L. REV.
873, 884 (1964).
81. 345 U.S. 594 (1953).
82. Id. at 608.
83. 356 U.S. 1 (1958).
84. Id. at 11.
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to their business activities." 5 His second argument was based on the
fact that millions of acres were subject to the tying clause and that
acceptance of the clauses conferred no benefit on the purchasers and
lessees. Unlike the usual tie-in situation, the absence of benefit to the
purchasers was incontestable because Northern Pacific was precluded
by the law against freight rebates from arguing a quid pro quo in the
form of a cheaper price for the land. In this unusual setting, it was
found that the "very existence of this host of tying arrangements is
itself compelling evidence of the defendant's great power.''"
The holding of the Northern Pacific case, that the necessary power
could be based on the fact that some of defendant's land was "often
prized" and "frequently essential" to buyers, served to avoid any
complex questions as to the relevant market in which the power was
to be measured. This holding as to uniqueness or relative uniqueness
was not supported by any findings of fact by the trial court 7 and was
a departure from prior cases. Traditional market power analysis would
have required an economic comparison of defendant's land holdings
with other available land.
In its 1962 decision in United States v. Loew's, Inc.,"' and its
1969 decision in Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v. United States Steel
Corp..89 the Court carried forward Justice Black's first argument in
Northern Pacific as to unique advantage to some buyers. In Fortner
plaintiff alleged a tying of unique credit arrangements to the sale of
prefabricated houses. The Court held that the case should go to trial
on the slightly different theory of whether defendant credit corporation,
a wholly owned subsidiary of United States Steel Corporation, had
the unique advantage of power over some borrowers. The Court said:
Our tie-in cases have made unmistakably clear that the economic
power over the tying product can be sufficient even though the
power falls far short of dominance and even though the power
exists only with respect to some of the buyers in the market.
(Citations omitted). As we said in the Loew's case (citation
omitted): "Even absent a showing of market dominance, the
85. Id. at 7.
86. Id. at 7-8.
87. The trial court had assumed that the relevant "market" in which to measure
the power was that for the defendant's land alone. Id. at 15. In a footnote in Fortner
Enterprises, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 505 n.2 (1969), the
majority came close to approving the trial court's approach by citing the Northern
Pacific case as involving uniqueness based on physical characteristics. See Smith v.
Scrivner-Boogaart, Inc., 447 F.2d 1014 (10th Cir. 1971) (court held tying involving
retail store leases properly submitted to the jury, which found for defendant).
88. 371 U.S. 38 (1962).
89. 394 U.S. 495 (1969).
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crucial economic power may be inferred from the tying product's
desirability to consumers or from uniqueness in its attributes."9
The Fortner decision also diluted considerably the second require-
ment for illegality of the tie-in, substantiality of commerce tied. The
complaint alleged the tying of cheap credit to be used to defray the
cost of development of certain land to the purchase of prefabricated
houses built on the land. Justice Black, writing for the majority, said
that "normally the controlling consideration is simply whether a total
amount of business, substantial enough in terms of dollar-volume so
as not to be merely de mninimis, is foreclosed to competitors by the
tie."'" Applying that standard to the annual sales of tied houses to
plaintiff the opinion concluded, "we cannot agree with respondents
that a sum of almost $200,000 is paltry or 'insubstantial.' "92
These tie-in decisions have created a curious type of quasi-per se
illegality. Although price fixing agreements, horizontal divisions of
territory, group boycotts and restraints on alienation are illegal regard-
less of the economic setting,9 3 the per se illegality of tie-ins is somewhat
different. Perhaps modifying Northern Pacific, Fortner seemed to
say that some inquiry as to the economic setting was required to
determine whether there was sufficient power in the tying market to
make a tie-in per se illegal.94 The economic inquiry, however, need
90. Id. at 502-03. The four dissents in Fortner agreed with the standard that
power or uniqueness is required.
91. Id. at 501.
92. Id. at 502.
93. Some economic inquiry may be relevant even as to these restraints. See, e.g.,
Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945) (approving some aspects of
what could have been termed a group boycott) ; Cartrade, Inc. v. Ford Dealers
Advertising Ass'n, 446 F.2d 289 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 997 (1972)
(group refusal to deal not illegal because no anti-competitive intent was shown);
United States v. Columbia Pictures Corp., 189 F. Supp. 153 (S.D.N.Y. 1960) (approv-
ing what could have been termed horizontal price fixing). Although the Supreme
Court in the recent decision of United States v. Topco Associates, Inc., 405 U.S.
596 (1972), said that no special justification is permitted as to price fixing and
division of territories, one suspects that limited arrangements might still be permitted
as they were in Chicago Bd. of Trade v. United States, 246 U.S. 231 (1918), and
United States v. Morgan, 118 F. Supp. 621 (S.D.N.Y. 1953).
94. The court in Advance Business Sys. & Supply Co. v. SCM Corp., 415 F.2d
55, 69 (4th Cir. 1969), after extensive analysis of Fortner, held: "Acquiescence in
the burdensome term by an appreciable number of customers gives rise to an
inference that SCM had 'some power over some buyers' in the market." The in-
terpretation of Fortner used by the court in SCM is not easy to derive from the
Fortner opinion. Justice Black did say that the existence of the seemingly burdensome
tie "may suggest that respondents had some special economic power in the credit
market." 394 U.S. at 504. He went on, however, to discuss other possible evidence of
power or "unique economic advantages over his competitors." 394 U.S. at 505. Although
it can be argued that the Northern Pacific "host of tying arrangements" language
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not be directed at finding a threat to competition. The "pernicious
effect on competition" '95 is invoked but assumed.
The empty appeal to effect on competition without opportunity
for the real effect to be considered, found in the tie-in cases, is also
found in Justice Black's 1959 opinion in Klor's v. Broadway-Hale
Stores." In that case, the Court held that a complaint alleging dam-
ages flowing from a group boycott stated a cause of action even though
there was no allegation of public injury. The opinion relied heavily
upon the hoary 1911 Standard Oil opinion,97 in which Justice White
discussed the meaning of the Sherman Act at great length. Justice
Black paraphrased that opinion as stating that the effect of both
sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act "was to adopt the common-law
proscription of all 'contracts or acts which it was considered had a
monopolistic tendency . . .' and which interfered with the 'natural
flow' of an appreciable amount of interstate commerce." '98  It is not
clear from the Kor's opinion whether Justice Black had in mind a
"quantitatively not insignificant" test similar to that of the tie-in
cases. He noted that the complaint alleged a "wide combination con-
sisting of manufacturers, distributors and a retailer"99 and concluded
that the alleged combination
clearly has, by its "nature" and "character," a "monopolistic
tendency." As such it is not to be tolerated merely because the
victim is just one merchant whose business is so small that his
[see text accompanying note 86 supra] supports the holding in SCM, the Fortner
decision does not.
After remand, the district court in the Fortner case directed a verdict for
plaintiff on the issue of liability. The court of appeals reversed [452 F.2d 1095
(1971), cert denied, 406 U.S. 919 (1972)], interpreting the Supreme Court's decision
as requiring proof of unique advantage in the credit market. But it went on to make
the strange suggestion that to find United States Steel and its wholly owned credit
subsidiary liable as co-conspirators, the jury might infer the necessary unique advan-
tage from the fact that United States Steel did not require its credit subsidiary to
maximize its profits and guaranteed some of its loans. 452 F.2d at 1102, 1103. That
United States Steel chose to offer cheap credit, whatever that means, should not
be evidence of unique advantage. From the court of appeals opinion it would appear
that Fortner offered no logical evidence of uniqueness, so a verdict should have
been directed for defendants. But see Smith v. Scrivner-Boogaart, Inc., 447 F.2d 1014,
1017 (10th Cir. 1971) (apparently approving of submission of tie-in count to jury
on little or no evidence).
95. Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5 (1953), discussing Times-
Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States, 345 U.S. 594 (1953). For a similar leap
from harm to a competitor to harm to competition see Utah Pie Co. v. Continental
Baking Co., 386 U.S. 685, 699-700 (1967), decided under the Robinson-Patman Act.
96. 359 U.S. 207 (1959).
97. 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
98. 359 U.S. at 211.
99. Id. at 213.
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destruction makes little difference to the economy. Monopoly
can as surely thrive by the elimination of such small businessmen,
one at a time, as it can by driving them out in large groups. In
recognition of this fact the Sherman Act has consistently been
read to forbid all contracts and combinations "which 'tend to
create a monopoly,' " whether "the tendency is a creeping one" or
"one that proceeds at full gallop."' 00
Not only did the Court in Klor's find it unnecessary to consider
the possible impact of the boycott in any market or submarket, but
it also seemed to have decided that there need not be an inquiry even
as to the degree of harm to plaintiff's ability to compete. No evidence
was required that plaintiff could not carry on its business just as well
by handling products of other manufacturers. Rather Justice Black
found it sufficient that the alleged combination to boycott drove plain-
tiff "out of business as a dealer in the defendants' products." and
deprived defendants "of their freedom to sell to Klor's" on equal
terms. 0 1 In other words, despite Justice Black's reference to the
Standard Oil language describing the Sherman Act as outlawing
combinations which "tend to create a monopoly," he seemed to hold
that a group boycott for the express purpose of restricting the business
opportunities of a particular business is an unacceptable form of
economic warfare and is per se illegal. The Klor's dictum requiring
interference with "an appreciable amount of interstate commer"ce" was
probably nothing more than a reference to interstate commerce juris-
dictional standards. 10 2
If the antitrust cases are analyzed on their facts rather than on,
their language, there would seem to be three types of illegal restraints
of-trade: (1) those which are in their nature torts, with the essential
concern being unfair injury to a particular business; (2) those-which
involve what seems to be an abuse of power, giving those with the
power more reward than they deserve, with some minimal disad-
vantage to competitors or consumers; and (3) those which, viewing,
100. Id. at 213-14.
101. Id. at 213.
102. The federal courts of appeal generally impose such a jurisdictional standard.
E.g., Washington State Bowling Proprietors Ass'n v. Pacific Lanes, Inc., 356 F.2d
371 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 384 U.S. 963 (1966) ; United States v Starlite Drive-In,
Inc., 204 F.2d 419 (7th Cir. 1953). Justice Black's suggestion that the Standard Oil
decision established an "appreciable amount" rule was probably inadvertent. Justice
White had said that the reference in the statute to "any part" of trade or commerce
had "a geographical and a distributive significance," with the distributive significance
being "any one of the classes of things forming a part of interstate or foreign
commerce." Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1, 61 (1911).
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the economic circumstances, pose a likelihood of substantially lessening
competition or tending to create a monopoly. 0 3
In considering the applicability of the tie-in cases to reciprocity,
it is important but difficult to determine which of the three basic
restraints is being applied. Group boycotts and coercive tie-ins would
seem to be illegal because they fall in the first two categories, so that
in dealing with these activities the Supreme Court could be said to
be fashioning rules of fair competition. The Court's opinions, how-
ever, including those in Kor's and in the recent decision on horizontal
division of territory,' do not expressly reveal such a simple motiva-
tion.'0 5 Instead, a broader theory of threat to competition is nominally
invoked to declare tie-ins to be per se illegal in some circumstances.
The per se rules are the result of a statistical type of justice and are
based on the likelihood of substantial injury in most cases, or at least
in the most important cases; on the low level of economic cost of total
prohibition because of the unlikelihood of economic justification; on
the desire for efficiency of administration of the laws; and on the
limitations on the ability of judges to decide complex economic ques-
tions.' Guided by these factors, the Court may well utilize its tie-in
rules in devising rules for the per se illegality of reciprocity, but
consideration of the minimal restraining effect of non-coercive re-
ciprocity could lead to a less restrictive approach.
BEYOND THE *TIE-IN ANALOGY
The Case for a Stricter Test
In rough terms, it can be said that the Supreme Court's require-
ment of market power means that only a "coercive" tie-in is illegal
103. The Klor's case fell in the first category. At least some of the "coercive"
tie-in and reciprocity cases would seem to fall in the second. One recent example
of the third group is United States v. Container Corp. of America, 393 U.S. 333
(1969) (exchange of pricing information). See Bork, The Rule of Reason and the
Per Se Concept: Price Fixing and Market Division, 74 YALE L.J. 775, 826-33 (1965) ;
Day, Exclusive Dealing, Tying and Reciprocity - A Reappraisal, 290 OIio ST. L.J.
539, 587-88 (1968).
104. United States v. Topco Associates, Inc., 405 U.S. 596 (1972).
105. The closest the Court has come to expressly adopting a theory of harm to
a particular competitor as the ultimate basis for illegality is the restraint on alienation
theory of the Schwinn case and of Dr. Miles Medical Co. v. John D. Park & Sons,
220 U.S. 373 (1911).
106. In United States v. Topco Associates, 405 U.S. 596 (1972), Justice Marshall,
writing for the Court, quoted with approval Justice Black's statement of the
reasons for per se illegality in Northern Pac. Ry. v. United States, 356 U.S. 1, 5
(1958). In summary, these reasons are (1) pernicious effect of the agreements or
practices, (2) lack of any redeeming virtue, (3) value of certainty in the law and
(4) avoidance of a complicated and prolonged economic investigation "so often wholly
fruitless when undertaken." Id.
1972]
MARYLAND LAW REVIEW
under section 1 of the Sherman Act. Of course, given the minimal
requirements for a showing of market power, only some likelihood of
some slight "coercion" is required. As emphasized by the court of
appeals in the White-Allis merger case, reciprocity introduces an anti-
competitive element in the marketplace because of the advantage over
other competing sellers. Thus a requirement of some dominance,
uniqueness or other leverage before reciprocity will be held illegal
seems appropriate.
Although the Supreme Court has never considered a case posing
the issue, it is generally assumed that the Times-Picayune dictum -
that power to impose the tie is not required for illegality under section
3 of the Clayton Act - accurately states the law. Professor Handler
has argued that the anomaly of the differing standards under the
Sherman and Clayton Acts should be removed by eliminating the
requirement of power under section 1 of the Sherman Act. 117 Although
such a change might require some further development of the distinction
between a tie-in and the sale of one product having separate elements, 10 8
it would certainly be in accord with the Supreme Court's 1949 descrip-
tion of tie-ins as serving "hardly any purpose beyond the suppression
of competition.' 0 9 However, the Times-Picayune dictum as to section
3 may not be the law, for in the Northern Pacific case the majority
said: "Of course where the seller has no control or dominance over the
tying product so that it does not represent an effectual weapon to pres-
sure buyers into taking the tied item any restraint of trade attribu-
table to such tying arrangements would obviously be insignificant at
most."" 0 Although the power or uniqueness requirement for section 1
tie-ins has been diluted, the Fortner decision suggests that it will be
retained. Thus, the Court, if ever asked, may well refuse to declare
a tie-in without power illegal, even under section 3 of the Clayton Act,
because the restraint of trade, in the words of the Northern Pacific
opinion, "would obviously be insignificant at most."
107. Handler, Antitrust: 1969, 55 CORNELL L. REv. 161, 162 (1970). See also
Day, Exclusive Dealing, Tying and Reciprocity - A Reappraisal, 29 OHIo ST. L.J. 539,
568-76 (1968).
108. In the Fortner case, the Court expressly avoided the problem of whether the
usual sale of goods on credit could be considered to involve a tying of the sale to the
credit. See Associated Press v. Taft-Ingalls Corp., 340 F.2d 753, 764 (6th Cir. 1965) ;
United States v. Jerrold Electronics Corp., 187 F. Supp. 545, 559 (E.D. Pa. 1960),
aff'd mem., 365 U.S. 567 (1961) ; Turner, The Validity of Tying Arrangements Under
the Antitrust Laws, 72 HARv. L. Ray. 50, 67-72 (1958).
109. Standard Oil Co. v. United States (Standard Stations), 337 U.S. 293, 305-06
(1949).
110. 356 U.S. at 6. See also Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v. United States Steel
Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 520 (1969) (Fortas, J., dissenting).
[VOL. XXXII
RECIPROCITY AND THE PRIVATE PLAINTIFF
If some power is to be required for reciprocity to be illegal, then
there is a difficult question of how to measure the power. The basic
rationale for illegality may be the determining factor, that is, whether
the practice is objectionable because of coercion of buyers or because of
exclusion of third parties. If the coercive element is the important
factor, then power in a reciprocity arrangement could be measured in
terms of dollars, with power to impose the restraint being found
whenever a firm's dollar volume of purchases from one or more sup-
pliers exceeded the dollar volume of sales to those suppliers.' Such
a rule would be in accord with the tendency of the tie-in cases to hold
that any sort of superior bargaining power is sufficient for a finding
of illegality.
The difficulties with applying ,this "coercive" tie-in approach to
reciprocity can be illustrated by a hypothetical situation. Suppose X,
a large manufacturer of tin cans, agrees to buy its requirements of
tinplate from Y so long as Y buys its requirements for fibre drums
from a division of the can company. The drums are to be used to
package welding rods produced by the tinplate manufacturer, Y, and
the dollar volume represented by the drum purchases is considerably
less than that represented by the tinplate purchases. The amount of
tinplate purchases is analogous to the "tying" product; the dollar
volume of drums sold is analogous to the "tied" product. In a suit
brought by a competitor of the fibre drum division based on foreclosure
from the market for such drums, the tie-in analogy would require the
plaintiff to show that the can manufacturer possessed power in the
tinplate market and that the amount of drum business so restrained
was not insubstantial. In such a situation, the relative dollar volume
would provide an appropriate basis for finding power, dominance or
leverage used to foreclose a portion of the fibre drum market.
Suppose, however, that the plaintiff is Z, a competitor of Y in
the tinplate market. If Z does not need fibre drums, or other products
sold by the can manufacturer, he will still be excluded from a portion
of the tinplate market. It seems illogical that he should be denied
recovery because Y does not have any leverage over the can manu-
facturer, but rather appears to have been the "coerced" party to
the reciprocity.1 1 2
111. Relative profitability would more accurately define the power but may be
uncertain and excessively complicated to derive.
112. Perhaps the tie-in theory would allow Z to recover from the can manu-
facturer on the basis of his abuse of power leading to unnatural foreclosure of
competition in both the tinplate and the fibre drum markets, but such result would
provide relief only as an accidental result of theory rather than by application of
the basic purpose of a rule requiring power or coercion. Furthermore, the target area
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The power relationship between the parties to reciprocity seems
to be beside the point. The foreclosure of Z from the tinplate market
would not be the result of "coercive" power. Rather it would be
primarily a function of the fact that his competitor, Y, buys fibre
drums while he does not. His injury would be the same even if X
and Y made equal purchases from each other. Parties to an agreement
who are in equilibrium with each other are not likely to be in equili-
bruim with their competitors. As already noted, it was the purchas-
ing power relative to competing sellers of rolling mills which the
Third Circuit emphasized in the Allis-Chalmers cases. Thus, if any
market power is to be required, it should be measured against the
power of competitors, rather than in terms of the parties to the agree-
ment. If such were the test, then very few reciprocity cases would
raise an issue as to whether there was sufficient power. Virtually all
reciprocity arrangements will involve dollar power vis-A-vis some
competitors, especially since illegality can be based on power on either
side of the reciprocal arrangement. Thus it may be an easy step to
acceptance of the suggestion of one writer that reciprocity should be
illegal without regard to power. n3
If the power part of the tie-in rule is not applicable or is almost
always found to be satisfied by the "not insignificant" substantiality
standard, then the rule against reciprocity will be very inclusive. As
has been pointed out above, the Fortner case has eroded the $500,000
figure of International Salt, and it is probable that the Court in Fortner
did not intend its $190,000 per year figure as a final minimum.
Moreover, a narrow focus on the volume of commerce foreclosed
by the particular contract or contracts in suit would not be appropriate,
because it is the total restrictive effects which are important in deter-
mining illegality. Therefore, in determining whether the amount of
commerce foreclosed is too insubstantial to warrant prohibition of the
practice, the relevant figure is the total volume of purchases or sales
affected by the "policy under challenge, '1 1 4 not the portion of this
total foreclosed to the particular plaintiff who brings suit. Moreover,
since harm to competition, not to a plaintiff, is the basis for the
illegality, the requisite substantiality could be found on either side of
the challenged arrangement.
doctrine is apt to bar recovery. See Wright, Legal Cause in Treble Damage Actions
Under the Clayton Act, 27 MD. L. REv. 275 (1967).
113. Hausman, Reciprocal Dealing and the Antitrust Laws, 77 HARV. L. REv. 873
(1964).
114. Fortner Enterprises, Inc. v. United States Steel Corp., 394 U.S. 495, 502
(1969).
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The Case for a Rule Related to Effect on Competition
It can be argued that the tie-in rule goes too far. The recent
decision of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in the Chicken Delight
case that the exclusiveness of the trade name, the alleged tying product,
satisfied the uniqueness requirement for illegality of a tie-in under the
Sherman Act further illustrates the broadly inclusive nature of tie-in
illegality and any reciprocity rule based on the tie-in cases."' The
Fortner case is one of the most dramatic examples of the extreme
reach of the tie-in rules."' The defendant steel company was struggling
to gain acceptance in the prefabricated homes market, and its sales were
undoubtedly not a significant percentage of that market, however
delimited. Fortner was a successful real estate developer who insisted
that United States Steel provide one hundred percent financing of the
cost of the land and its development as well as credit for the purchase
of the prefabricated houses. Although such liberal credit was contrary
to defendant's usual policy, it acquiesced. When Fortner became dis-
satisfied with the deal, apparently on justifiable grounds of defects in
the houses, he relied on the credit terms which he had imposed to
state a cause of action for an illegal tie-in. Even if the plaintiff had
been an excluded manufacturer of pre-fabricated homes, it is difficult
to perceive a frustration of any of the purposes of antitrust laws in the
Fortner situation. Even if there had been a clear tie-in in Fortner,
a regulatory rule which reaches a $190,000 deal in a multi-million
dollar industry may interfere with, rather than promote, competition.
Thus it may make better sense for the courts to reject the tie-in analogy
and apply another substantiality test.
There are limitations to the International Salt dictum that it is
"unreasonable, per se, to foreclose competitors from any substantial
market.""n 7 Justice Frankfurter, in the Standard Stations case,"' con-
trasted tie-ins with exclusive dealing or requirements contracts: "Tying
115. Siegel v. Chicken Delight, Inc., 448 F.2d 43 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied,
405 U.S. 955 (1972). Accord, Warriner Hermetics, Inc. v. Copeland Refrigeration
Corp., 463 F.2d 1003 (5th Cir. 1972). Contra, Susser v. Carvel Corp., 332 F.2d 505,
519 (2d Cir. 1964). As discussed in note 94 supra, the holding in Advance Business
Sys. & Supply Co. v. SCM, 415 F.2d 55, 69 (4th Cir. 1969), that, in essence, no
showing of power is required, seems to be wrong.
116. For a more complete statement of the facts and an incisive criticism of the
Fortner decision and of the Court's application of standards to antitrust plaintiffs
different from those applicable to defendants see Dam, Fortner Enterprises v. United
States Steel: "Neither a Borrower nor a Lender Be," in 1969 SuP. CT. REV. 1 (P.
Kurland ed.).
117. 332 U.S. at 396.
118. Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 337 U.S. 293 (1949).
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agreements serve hardly any purpose beyond the suppression of com-
petition. . . . Requirements contracts, on the other hand, may well be
of economic advantage to buyers as well as to sellers, and thus in-
directly of advantage to the consuming public.""' He went on to
consider the difficulties of having a court examine the economic effect
of exclusive dealing in a particular case and adopted instead a limited
per se illegality rule: "We conclude, therefore, that the qualifying clause
of § 3 is satisfied by proof that competition has been foreclosed in a
substantial share of the line of commerce affected.' 120 In a context of
virtually all retail gasoline stations being bound exclusively to one
supplier and the defendant having 23 percent of total market sales with
6.8 percent of the stations owned by defendant and 6.7 percent bound
to defendant by exclusive dealing contracts, the Supreme Court, with
four justices dissenting, affirmed the judgment against Standard Oil.
In Tampa Electric Co. v. Nashville Coal Co., 12 ' the Supreme
Court was faced with a challenge to a contract to purchase coal re-
quirements for a generating station in Florida for twenty years. As
the Court defined the relevant market, the contract involved less than
one percent of coal sales. Under the "substantial share of the relevant
market" test of Standard Stations it was held that the contract was
not illegal. The Court's elaboration of the "substantial share" concept
was somewhat helpful to this unsettled area of the law:
To determine substantiality in a given case, it is necessary to
weigh the probable effect of the contract on the relevant area of
effective competition, taking into account the relative strength of
the parties, the proportionate volume of commerce involved in
relation to the total volume of commerce in the relevant market
area, and the probable immediate and future effects which pre-
emption of that share of the market might have on effective com-
petition therein. 22
The Court made it clear that it was not just the percentage of the
market foreclosed which was determinative. Distinguishing its earlier
decisions, the Court said: "There is here neither a seller with a domi-
nant position in the market as in Standard Fashions, supra; nor myriad
outlets with substantial sales volume, coupled with an industry-wide
practice of relying upon exclusive contracts, as in Standard Oil, supra;
nor a plainly restrictive tying arrangement as in International Salt,
119. Id. at 305-06.
120. Id. at 314.
121. 365 U.S. 320 (1961).
122. Id. at 329.
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supra."'12 In finding that the twenty-year term of the contract was not
excessive, the Court also considered the general economic justification
in the particular industry.1 2
4
Before the Tampa Electric decision, there was great doubt as to
the proper interpretation of the Standard Stations decision. Kessler
and Stern, analyzing the earlier case in 1959, were remarkably predic-
tive. They advocated the share-of-the-market substantiality rule as the
proper interpretation and approved of it, but mildly criticized the
Court for not requiring the Government to present uncomplicated,
available economic evidence of barriers to entry.125 Tampa Electric
probably repairs that minor flaw.
Writing in 1958 in reaction to the Northern Pacific decision,
Professor Turner argued that some tie-ins should be illegal without
regard to power or uniqueness of the tying product if non-trivial sub-
stantiality were present, but that other tie-ins should be judged under
the rule of reason and still others under the exclusive dealing, market-
share test of Standard Stations.2 ' The rule of reason, he suggested,
should be applied where the tying product is given free or sold at a
loss 1 2 7 ; the Standard Stations test should be used where the tied
product is purchased for resale. "Tie-in sales to distributors foreclose
competing sellers of the tied product from the consuming market," he
wrote, "only if those competing sellers cannot obtain other outlets with
comparable access to that market.' 128  As yet there is no indication
that the courts are willing to engage in such refined distinctions in the
tie-in cases. But if, as Turner suggests, the tie-in rules reach many
situations involving no significant anti-competitive effect, there is reason
-to hesitate before applying the rules to the uncharted area of reciprocity.
The underlying basis of the tie-in cases should first be re-examined.
123. Id. at 334.
124. Id. at 334-35. As the Court did not analyze or place much reliance on the
economic justification in the industry, it is not clear whether such a defense is
generally available in an exclusive dealing case. See Bok, The Tampa Electric Case
and the Problem of Exclusive Arrangements Under the Clayton Act, in 1961 Sup. CT.
REV. 267, 283-84 (P. Kurland ed.).
125. Kessler & Stern, Competition, Contract, and Vertical Integration, 69 YALE
L.J. 1, 24-37 (1959). For a sharply different view of the workability of the rule,
see Bok, The Tampa Electric Case and the Problem of Exclusive Arrangements
Under the Clayton Act, in 1961 SuP. CT. REv. 267 (P. Kurland ed.).
126. Turner, The Validity of Tying Arrangements Under the Antitrust Laws,
72 HARV. L. REv. 50 (1958).
127. Id. at 65-66.
128. Id. at 72. Discussing the Standard Stations case, he emphasizes that his
test is foreclosure of a part of the ultimate consuming market, and that assessment
of the degree of access through alternative middlemen depends on the consumer
preferences for dealing with particular types of dealers or distributors.
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The test of substantiality related to likelihood of harm to competi-
tion was very likely what Justice Jackson had in mind when he wrote
the opinion in the benchmark International Salt case, despite later
Supreme Court interpretation to the contrary. The defendant there
required users of its patented salt dispensing machines to use only its
salt in the machines. As noted in the Northern Pacific case, 2 9 the
opinion did not seem to rely on the fact that the machines were
patented. Without explanation, Justice Jackson stated, "the tendency
of the arrangement to accomplishment of monopoly seems obvious."' 3
Although this conclusion might have been based on the Court's prior
patent misuse cases,'' it is more likely that the conclusion of obvious
monopolistic tendency was based on the admitted fact that defendant
was the country's largest producer of salt for industrial uses. For the
largest producer to use restrictive agreements, with the likely effect
of entrenching or increasing its market share, could be deemed to pose
a probability of harm to competition. 132
Given the lack of evidence of power in land markets, the Northern
Pacific tie-in case could have been decided in similar terms, that is,
in terms which reverse the now settled tie-in law. Northern Pacific
was undoubtedly a leading, or "dominant," factor in some of the trans-
portation markets or submarkets in its area. Its tie-in arrangements
were, like International Salt's, designed to enhance its position in its
primary business. Thus the Court's casual treatment of the question of
the power of Northern Pacific in the tying product, land, was appro-
priate. Similarly, if a percentage-of-the-market standard is used in re-
ciprocity cases, courts may be expected to treat casually or ignore the
question of purchasing power where the buyer has a leading position in
the market in which he is promoting his sales through reciprocity.' 3'
The Standard Stations holding was that requirements contracts
are not per se illegal because "they may well be of economic advantage
129. 356 U.S. at 9. But see Times-Picayune Publishing Co. v. United States,
345 U.S. 594, 608 (1953); Standard Oil Co. v. United States (Standard Stations),
337 U.S. 293, 307 (1949).
130. 332 U.S. at 396.
131. E.g., Morton Salt Co. v. G. S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488 (1942).
132. See Comment, Franchises, Requirements Contracts and Tie-Ins: One Test
For a Tangled Two, 74 YALE L.J. 691 (1965), wherein it is argued that the exclusive
dealing and requirements contracts test should be applied to tie-ins, and it is con-
cluded that the courts should look to the purpose and probable effects of both types
of vertically integrating arrangements.
133. In an unusual case, substantiality of foreclosure might be found in the buying
market. See Elder-Beerman Stores Corp. v. Federated Dep't Stores, Inc., 459 F.2d 138
(6th Cir. 1972) (buyer's aggregation of exclusive selling rights illegal only if a
resulting foreclosure of market alternatives shown).
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to the buyers as well as the sellers." Although the type of business
advantage involved in exclusive dealing is arguably different, certainly
reciprocity is typically believed by the parties to be of mutual benefit.
Both are methods for obtaining relatively dependable customers, a
business arrangement which is not necessarily harmful to long-run
competition.
Although the percentage-of-the-market substantiality test is theo-
retically attractive as proscribing only arrangements which are shown
to pose a likelihood of restraining -trade, it does present difficulties of
proof which may pose too great a barrier to antitrust enforcement in
the reciprocity area.'" If a percentage is to be shown, the market
must be defined, and this can be difficult. Moreover, it is likely that the
competitive effect of the foreclosure can be shown by aggregating
restrictive foreclosure practices of a number of competitors as well
as by the percentage foreclosure achieved by one defendant. Proof
that virtually the entire market was foreclosed by written exclusive
dealing contracts was probably not too difficult in Standard Stations.
But in the absence of express contracts, the problem is quite different.
Proof of bilateral reciprocity agreements between one defendant and
a number of customer-suppliers sufficient to meet the substantiality
requirement may be difficult, as shown by the General Dynamics case,
but should not be insuperable where the essence of the proof is the
pattern of non-competitive, higher prices being paid. However, a
private plaintiff who would have to prove substantial market fore-
closure by showing that a number of competitors engage in the practice
with a number of customer-suppliers would be apt to forego the lawsuit.
CONCLUSION
Existing authority suggests three possible rules as to the illegality
of reciprocity. By analogy to tie-ins, reciprocity may be illegal in all
cases involving a not insubstantial amount of commerce or it may be
so only where there is quantitative substantiality and it is imposed
by superior bargaining power, retaining the power of uniqueness rule
of the section 1 tie-in cases. By analogy to exclusive dealing, it may be
illegal only where percentage-of-the-market substantiality is present on
at least one side.
Business reciprocity is but another form of the fundamental cul-
tural norm of returning favors."' This norm is reinforced by a natural
tendency to deal with those whom we know and, therefore, have reason
134. See Bok, supra note 122.
135. ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS, Book VIII, ch. 13.
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to trust. The propriety of the current broad attack by the Government
on reciprocity practices of very large corporations does not dictate the
proper rule for smaller businesses buying non-trivial amounts of goods
or services. Perhaps what is needed is some alternative quantitative
substantiality test. Justice Black said in Fortner, "it is easy to see how a
big company with vast sums of money in its treasury could wield very
substantial power in a credit market."'186 Such an absolute bigness con-
sideration probably played a part in the Northern Pacific tie-in decision.
There is, as yet, however, no antitrust tool for overtly dealing with
absolute bigness absent a showing of market or monopoly power.3 7 The
possibilities for unnecessary and wasteful interference with business
practices by a rule of strict illegality for reciprocity must be weighed
against the apparent lack of any economic justification for the practice.
Justice White's statement in a footnote in Fortner, that tie-ins "may
permit clandestine price cutting in products which otherwise would
have no price competition at all because of fear of retaliation from the
few other producers dealing in the market, '11s applies as well to re-
ciprocity, but this fact was not accepted by the Court as a justification
for the practice.
The Supreme Court has not indicated that it will be swayed in
future reciprocity cases by the legitimate value of avoiding unnecessary
interference with business choice.' 9 Absent a reversal of the Court's
pattern of rejection of economic justifications for tie-ins and recipro-
city, and assuming the continuation of the apparent policy that anti-
trust cases should go to the jury on very little evidence, it must be
concluded that any business which engages in "not insignificant"
reciprocity, even though tacitly arrived at, should stand ready to
show that it pays competitive prices considering the quality and service
obtained. Otherwise, the inference of combination is permissible, and
136. 394 U.S. at 509.
137. But see Complaint in In re Kellogg Co., File No. 7110004 (F.T.C. Jan. 24,
1972) 1972 ANTITRUST & TRADE REG. REP. No. 547, D-1, seeking under section 5
of the Federal Trade Commission Act divestiture, sharing of brand names, limitation
of promotional practices and other relief against four manufacturers of ready-to-eat
cereal.
138. 394 U.S. at 514 n.9.
139. On the other hand, except for the unfortunate Fortner case, it might be
said that the Court has not been presented with situations calling for it to accept
some presumption in favor of the legality of business methods and activities. Although
rare, there are some court of appeals decisions which seem to use such a presumption,
so that a burden of establishing illegality is cast on the Government or other
plaintiff. E.g., Belliston v. Texaco, Inc., 455 F.2d 175, 183-84 (10th Cir. 1972)
(Texaco's commission arrangement on tires, batteries and accessories supplied to its
dealers not illegal in absence of coercion of the dealers).
[VOL. XXXII
RECIPROCITY AND THE PRIVATE PLAINTIFF
the pattern of reciprocal purchases may lead to a finding of violation
of section 1 of the Sherman Act.
Most of the troubling tie-in litigation has been initiated by par-
ties to tie-in agreements, seeking relief from bad bargains. Assuming
that the willing participant in reciprocal dealing will not be allowed to
recover, a rule declaring agreements to engage in reciprocity illegal if
they involve a not insubstantial amount of commerce, either in terms
of dollar amount or percentage of the market, would not be likely
to produce a large amount of litigation. The business incentives
toward settlement where one party is considering naming his desired
customer as a party defendant, coupled with the unique availability of
settlement on terms acceptable to all parties, should tend to make in-
stances of litigation rare. Assume that four suppliers share all of one
buyer's business on the basis of reciprocity. A third-party competitor,
thinking that he has been illegally foreclosed because his offer to sell
at lower prices was rejected, threatens the competitors and their custo-
mer with suit. A likely solution would be for the customer to settle
by giving a share of his business to such potential plaintiff. Assuming
further than none of the reciprocal suppliers consent to being replaced,
each of their shares would be reduced to accommodate the newcomer.
It may also be expected that the reciprocal suppliers will be forced to
lower their prices to a level competitive with that of the newly admitted
supplier. The maintenance of two price levels, the higher being paid
to reciprocal purchaser-suppliers, would be unlikely because such a
price differential would be strong evidence of restraint by reciprocity.
As other potential suppliers enter the picture, get a share of the
formerly tied business, and probably drive the price down, the recipro-
city will be minimized and, probably, abandoned.
Reciprocity involves more than an economic manifestation of the
golden rule. Although occasional placement of a relatively small order
for reasons other than service, price and quality certainly constitutes no
barrier to competition, a large corporation's policy of consistently
engaging in reciprocity almost certainly is anti-competitive. When the
process of selling is reduced to the negotiation of one's fair share of
the market, competition is displaced and the economy injured. Fore-
closed competitors, with occasional help from the courts, should be able
to do much to eliminate such reciprocity from the American economy.
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